Post-breach data control

How PastWipe compares

How post-breach data control differs from DLP, DRM/IRM, encryption, CASB and DSPM, with an architecture overview and a sample evidence record.

Most data-security categories are built to stop data from leaving, or to find where it is. PastWipe™ starts from the assumption that some copies will leave anyway, and asks a different question: should this copy still be usable here, now, for this purpose? It complements the tools below rather than replacing them.

Category comparison

Approach Main question it answers Where it stops What PastWipe adds
Data loss prevention (DLP) Is sensitive data leaving through an approved channel? Once a copy has left, DLP has no further say over it Re-checks conditions when the copy is used, in supported workflows
DRM / IRM Is this user licensed to open this document? Usually tied to a user licence, not to device, environment or incident state Evaluates identity together with device, environment, purpose and current security state, and records every decision
Encryption (at rest, in transit) Can someone without the key read the data? Anyone with valid access or a stolen session sees plaintext Asks whether valid access should still work when conditions are no longer trusted
CASB / SSE Which cloud apps are used, and is traffic allowed? Controls the route, not the data after it arrives Keeps policy attached to selected data beyond the gateway
DSPM Where is sensitive data, and who can reach it? Finds and scores exposure; does not control later use Acts on selected data at the point of use and produces evidence

These are categories, not products. Many organisations run several of them, and PastWipe sits alongside them. Integrations and deployment

Architecture overview

Architecture: a requester asks for protected data; the PastWipe control layer checks identity, device, environment, purpose, time and security state, uses keys from the client's KMS or HSM, returns allow, deny, restrict or degrade, and writes an evidence record to the client's SIEM and audit systems, all inside the client-controlled environment.
Reference architecture. Components, connectors and signals are confirmed for each evaluation.

Example: degrading a request after an incident

A worked example.

  1. A finance export containing customer records is protected with a policy: purpose "quarterly reporting", approved devices only, normal security state.
  2. An incident is declared for one workload. A copy of the export is later opened on an unmanaged laptop outside the approved environment.
  3. PastWipe evaluates the request. Identity is valid, but the device is not approved and the security state has changed.
  4. The policy says to degrade: the requester sees totals only, not individual records.
  5. The decision is recorded as evidence:
{
  "record": "ev-2026-09-29-000184",
  "time": "2026-09-29T09:14:07Z",
  "object": "exports/customers-q3.xlsx#sheet=records",
  "operation": "render",
  "requester": { "identity": "j.doe@example.com", "device": "unmanaged", "environment": "outside-approved" },
  "policy": "finance-export-v4",
  "declared_purpose": "quarterly-reporting",
  "security_state": "incident-declared:workload-17",
  "decision": "degrade",
  "result": "aggregate-only",
  "signature": "ed25519:…"
}

The record shows what was requested, what was evaluated and what happened. Evidence scope

Scope an evaluation · How PastWipe works · Trust Centre